嵇尚洲:上海对外经贸大学金融学院副教授,博士。研究方向:公司治理、资产定价。
F425
本文受国家社科基金一般项目“国有大型企业董事会重构研究”(12BGL003)、上海市教委科研创新重点项目“国有独资企业外部董事选聘及决策机制”(12ZS170)及085工程项目资助。
本文从地缘关系角度对董事会决策进行研究,认为独立董事与上市公司总部同处一地,与CEO及其他高管易于形成亲密关系,更有获得企业软性信息的优势。本地独立董事这种信息优势会影响到董事会的决策效果,尤其对信息不对称程度较高的国有企业会有较大价值。本文运用A股上市公司2006~2010年数据研究独立董事地缘关系对董事会决策的影响,发现本地独立董事数量的增加对企业并购规模和并购频率有明显抑制作用,其中国有企业本地独立董事与企业并购决策的关系更加显著,表明国有企业的本地独立董事发挥信息优势,显著影响了董事会决策,在国有企业普遍存在并购冲动的情形下具有积极意义。本研究从一个侧面反映了国有企业信息不对称较为严重,独立董事获得更多信息是有效治理的重要保证。
People hope to better monitor the management of the board through bringing outside directors to the board. However, outside directors need soft information to effectively play the role of monitoring and decision advice. We study the data from China and find local independent directors have significant relations with the monitoring and decision efficiency. Comparing to the study by the foreign scholars we think our results are consistent with the conclusions from foreign scholars. We all agree that the number of the local independent directors has negative relations with M&A price and the number of cases. So the local independent directors can improve the efficiency of M&A decision, especially for SOEs. The more sources of information guarantee the efficiency of the monitoring. Our study reflects state-owned enterprises have more serious information asymmetry, and the independent directors with more information has become an important guarantee of effective governance.
嵇尚洲,陈伟,晋涵.独立董事地缘关系与企业董事会决策*[J].上海对外经贸大学学报,2015,(3):45-56.
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