From the perspective of principal-agent theory,this paper analyzes the impact of enterprise performance evaluation and compensation incentive mechanism on the behavior of enterprise managers and its consequences.On this basis,this paper analyzes the favorable impact of the introduction of EVA assessment by central government owned enterprises on restraining the managers from keeping too much monetary funds and thus inducing low-efficiency investment behavior.In order to know the actual impact of EVA assessment on the business behavior of state-controlled listed companies,this paper uses the financial data of 6 years before and after the implementation of EVA assessment by such companies to empirically test the implementation effect of the SASAC's EVA business performance assessment method.Research shows that EVA performance assessment can effectively restrain enterprises from over-investing,and the higher the weight of EVA assessment indicators in business performance assessment,the higher the level of free cash flow retained by the enterprise,and the more obvious its regulating effect is.This paper has practical reference significance for studying the implementation effect of the "Measures for Business Performance Evaluation" revised by the SASAC.