张焰朝:河南财经政法大学会计学院讲师,管理学博士。研究方向:公司治理、资本市场财务与会计。
F272/F275
本文受教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“供应链金融对企业投资行为的影响研究”(项目编号:21YJC630001);河南省哲学社会科学规划项目“数字化转型对财务决策的影响及路径研究——以河南上市企业为例”(项目编号:2022CJJ124)以及山东省自然科学基金青年项目“企业数字化转型的策略性信息披露行为及市场识别研究”(项目编号:ZR2022QG021)的资助
中小投资者保护一直是资本市场关注的焦点,具有官方背景的投资者保护机构能否消除中小投资者在获取企业信息上的壁垒,达到监督企业行为的目的一直是研究者关注的问题。本文以 A 股上市企业为研究对象,采用双重差分模型考察了投服中心持股行权对企业违规的治理效应。研究发现,投服中心持股行权对企业违规行为具有显著的抑制作用。 作用渠道检验表明投服中心持股行权通过改善企业内部信息环境和抑制大股东掏空降低了企业的违规倾向。进一步分析发现:投服中心持股行权显著降低了企业的严重违规行为, 对企业的一般违规行为影响并不明显;投服中心持股行权对企业违规的治理效应在内控质量较低的企业、国有企业及媒体监督较弱的企业中更为明显。投服中心持股行权作为一种有效的公司治理机制,能够对企业产生威慑效应并发挥监督治理效果,已经成为行政监管等外部监管以外的有益补充。
The protection of small and medium investors has always been the focus of the capital market. Can the investor protection institutions with official background eliminate the barriers for small and medium investors to obtain corporate information and achieve the purpose of supervising corporate behavior?Taking A-share listed enterprises as the research object, this paper uses the differential model to investigate the governance effect of investor service center’s shareholding exercise on corporate violations. It is found that the shareholding and exercise of the investor service center has a significant inhibitory effect on the illegal behavior of enterprises. The function channel test shows that the shareholding exercise of investor service center reduces the tendency of enterprises to violate rules by improving the internal information environment of enterprises and restraining the hollowing out of major shareholders. Further analysis shows that: the shareholding and exercise rights of investor service center significantly reduce the serious violations of enterprises, but have no obvious impact on the general violations of enterprises; The governance effect of investor and service center’s shareholding and exercise on enterprise violation is more obvious in enterprises with low internal control quality, state-owned enterprises and enterprises with weak media supervision. The research shows that as an effective corporate governance mechanism, the shareholding and exercise of investor services center can have a deterrent effect on enterprises and exert the effect of supervision and governance. It has become a useful supplement to administrative supervision and other external supervision.
张焰朝,杨金凤.投服中心持股行权能抑制企业违规吗?——基于准自然实验的证据*[J].上海对外经贸大学学报,2023,(5):107-124.
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